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A B S T R A C T
Due to information asymmetry problem in financial markets good quality firms often find it difficult to prove to
external finance providers about their true quality and to distinguish themselves from bad quality firms. We
argue that instead of sending indirect signals to financial market good quality firms could focus on improving
their productivity to obtain external finance. Besides relying solely on firms' balance sheet information external
finance providers using firms' TFP or labour productivity information would have a true knowledge of firms'
efficiency and risk. Overall, using a panel of 1591 Chinese listed manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2016
we find that productivity measured by TFP or labour productivity is statistically and economically important and
positive in determining firms' external finance, i.e. total leverage, new issue of equity and long-term debt. We
find that productivity is helpful for firms to raise new equity finance, but only some weak results for total
leverage and long-term debt. Such results hold for both the whole sample and private firm sample. We also find
that large and/or old firms and exporting firms are able to make better use of their productivity to gain external
finance than their respective counterparts, i.e. small young firms and non-exporting firms. The causality of the
regression results is also confirmed by difference-in-difference tests using an exogenous industrial policy shock.
1. Introduction
It is well recognised that financial market imperfections result in
good quality firms being unable to raise external funds for their prof-
itable projects. There has been extensive research that focus on firms'
financing behaviour under the assumption that firms are adversely af-
fected by financial market imperfections. Studies have also been in-
vestigating how legal and institutional advancement may improve the
market imperfection situation and consequently improve the accessi-
bility of external finance for all firms in the market (e.g. Bancel &
Mittoo, 2004; Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001;
Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Ӧztekin & Flannery, 2012). Anecdotal evidence
seems to show that financial institutions tend to base their lending
decisions on bank relations or firms' balance sheet information, which is
subject to window dressing. Tan, Zhu, Zeng, and Gao (2014) does find
evidence that non-state Chinese listed firms manipulate their earnings
to meet the performance targets required by the stock market in order
to raise equity finance. Johan and Wu (2014) also find that the quality
of the lender-borrower relationship makes no contribution to small
firms' access to debt in China or Canada. Therefore, external financial
resources do not necessarily go to the truly efficient firms. However,
little is known about how heterogeneous firms can distinguish them-
selves from others and prove to external finance providers about their
true worthiness,1 and therefore suffer less from the information asym-
metry problem under given institutional environment. In other words,
little is known about whether truly good firms do get external finance.
We try to fill in this gap in this paper.
In recent years, the relationship between firms' productivity and
their finance has attracted increasing attention among scholars for most
major economies, e.g. Chen and Guariglia (2013) for China, Krishnan,
Nandy, and Puri (2015) for the US, Ferrando and Ruggieri (2018) for
Euro area countries. Most recently, Egger and Keuschnigg (2017)'s
model shows that banks are only willing to lend to firms with a
minimum productivity level, which will enable firms to thrive in the
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market and allow banks to break even from the lending. Neuhann and
Saidi (2018) find from US public firms that with better informational
economy of scale, i.e. more information about firms became available
to banks, following the deregulation of universal banks (which conduct
both commercial and investment bank businesses), universal banks fi-
nance riskier but more productive firms. However, none of these papers
has tested directly whether high productivity itself would help firms to
be more attractive to banks to get loans.
This paper aims to further contribute to the empirical research on
firms' financing behaviour. In our study we explore how firms' pro-
ductivity, which is measured by either total factor productivity (TFP) or
labour productivity, can be used as a relevant indicator of firms' true
value and helps firms to raise external finance. In doing so, we use
Chinese listed manufacturing firms' data.
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to test whether
productivity helps firms to raise external finance, and whether better
firms do get relatively more external finance. Consequently, we may be
able to identify productivity as a good indicator of firms' quality from
the perspective of external finance providers. A reliable indicator of
firms' quality may help to overcome information asymmetry problem in
the financial markets to some extent and channel external finance into
efficient firms. Our research effectually also contributes to the firm
capital structure literature, which often debates about what drives
firms' financing choices. We offer an alternative view. Rather than
being a choice of firms due to cost minimisation as suggested by the
pecking order theories, static trade off theories and market timing
theories, our research implies that firms' capital structure is also de-
termined by their ability of raising finance from outsiders, which may
also vary across different forms of external finance. In other words, our
results would show that firms' capital structure is not only determined
by what firms want, but also what they are able to have. The applica-
tion on the Chinese listed manufacturing firm data provides a suitable
testing environment for this research.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the
relevant literature and describes our theoretical idea. Section 3 presents
the equations for empirical tests and discusses our method. Section 4
describes our data. Section 5 discusses the regression results. Section 6
further verifies the causality of our results, and finally Section 7 con-
cludes.
2. A brief literature overview
There has been an increasing interest in the relationship between
productivity and finance both at aggregate and firm level (see Heil,
2018, for a survey). While most studies focus on macro factors, Gatti
and Love (2008), Moreno-Badia and Slootmaekers (2009), Chen and
Guariglia (2013), Krishnan et al. (2015), Ferrando and Ruggieri (2018)
among others find evidence of direct link between firms' finance and
productivity, as finance may enable firms to optimise operations and
carry out productivity enhancing investments. There is also limited
research on the reverse link. As mentioned above, Egger and
Keuschnigg (2017) and Neuhann and Saidi (2018) find that banks are
willing to lend to productive firms even if they are riskier. Besides,
Gonzalez and James (2007) using a panel of US listed firms shows that
technology firms have easier access to bank lending, and current
earnings and cash flows are significantly less important in determining
such finance for technology firms than for non-technology firms. It is
not unreasonable to interpret their results as that technology, a likely
proxy for productivity, has a positive effect on firms' access to bank
lending. However, none of these researches has provided any direct
evidence whether productivity helps firms to raise external finance,
which we do in this paper.
In the finance and growth literature a large number of studies, at
both aggregate (e.g. Beck, Levine, & Loayza, 2000; Carlin & Mayer,
2003) and firm levels (e.g. Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009; Guariglia,
Liu, & Song, 2011), find that a sound financial system or good
accessibility of financial resources enable growth (e.g. Ayyagari,
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2011; King & Levine, 1993). On the
other hand, in the long-term, economic growth is largely a reflection of
rising productivity, as it drives growth through its direct effects such as
improved effort and efficiency. Krugman (1990, 1994, 1997) reached
his famous conclusion that “productivity isn't everything, but in the
long run it is almost everything”, when examining the relationship
between productivity improvement and economic growth. In this
paper, what we try to test potentially may bridge the two areas of lit-
erature together. Our finding may show an indirect channel that pro-
ductivity drives growth through enabling external finance.
The signalling theory developed by Ross (1977) suggests that
managers have incentives to signal the market of firms' high quality by
choosing high leverage, as issuing debt can expose firms to costly fi-
nancial distress (Ovtchinnikov, 2010). Though Ross's model also sug-
gests that firms' high quality would be associated with high leverage,
Ross models leverage as a choice of firms, whereas we consider that
firms are eager to demonstrate their qualities in order to compete for
external finance. In his theory, the incentive for signalling is primarily
managers' personal gains, whereas we consider that the incentive for
firms to prove their true quality is to obtain external finance. Yet in the
signalling theory, quality is not defined in terms of observable variables
(Smith Jr. & Watts, 1992), whereas we specify quality as firms' pro-
ductivity.
Our study also partially overlaps the research on a role for pro-
ductivity in the firm capital structure literature. To formally test the
effects of productivity on firms' external finance, our empirical model is
largely derived from the established capital structure literature. The
main ones predicting the observed behaviour of utilising external fi-
nance by a value-maximising firm include the Myers and Majluf
(1984)'s pecking order theory, the static trade-off theory and the market
timing theory (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). Also due to managerial opti-
mism (Heaton, 2002) whether firms accept positive net present value
projects may depend on whether the projects require external finance.
Such financing decisions are only related to firms' free cash flow and
not influenced by asymmetric information and rational agency costs
(Heaton, 2002). According to the agency theory, firms' capital structure
is likely an optimal response of partially entrenched and risk-neutral
managers who balance between overinvestment and the risk of take-
overs (Zwiebel, 1996). Morellec's (2004) real option model also shows
capital structure as risk-neutral managers' choice between investment
and retaining control. Mande, Park, and Son (2011) argue that good
corporate governance reduces firms' agency costs and consequently
increases firms' likelihood of issuing equity finance. Crespí and Martín-
Oliver (2015) also argue the reason that family firms have easier access
to debt than non-family firms is due to their lower agency cost.
Nevertheless empirical evidence of those studies is inconclusive
(e.g. Fama & French, 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2003; Sarkar & Zapatero,
2003). It is possibly attributable to statistical testing difficulties and the
practical interpretation of those hypotheses (e.g. Leary & Roberts,
2010) and seem to depend on the particular stochastic process assumed
for firms' earnings, i.e. internal source of finance (Sarkar & Zapatero,
2003). The magnitude and persistency of the impact of market timing
on capital structure are also challenged by some empirical findings,
such as Alti (2006), and Hovakimian (2006). There is also evidence that
firms often actually issue debt and equity simultaneously to reduce
variation in their capital structure (e.g. Billingsley, Smith, & Lamy,
1994).
However, so far the capital structure literature includes no explicit
role for firms' productivity. We argue that firms' productivity demon-
strates firms' true value and therefore helps firms to raise external fi-
nance through the channel of mitigating information asymmetry. Our
results would be more consistent with the pecking order theory, i.e. we
confirm that more productive firms are able to utilise finance of higher
pecking order or more expensive external finance.
A stream of research finds that legal and institutional improvement
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in a country can benefit the country's financial development and ac-
cessibility for borrowers overall (e.g. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine,
2003). Vanacker, Heughebaert, and Manigart (2014) find better
shareholder protection and bankruptcy laws help new technology-
based firms in six European countries to gain better probability to ac-
cess and have more amount of equity and debt finance. Further, Feng,
Fu, and Kutan (2019) find evidence of double-edged results of gov-
ernment intervention in China, which promotes firms' access to loans
but also forces firms to make bribe payments to gain this financial ac-
cess. Nevertheless, these authors' focus is on macro environment rather
than individual firms.
Financial institutions may be tempted to use firm's balance sheet
information, such as profitability, financial health, previous loan pay-
ment history, as market signal of credit worthiness and to determine the
eligibility of a firm for access to loans, since these information can be
easily monitored (see Brealey, Leland, & Pyle, 1977; Fama, 1984).
However, balance sheet information, on the other hand, is easily ma-
nipulated and often cannot convince outsiders about the true value of a
firm (Tan et al., 2014). Institutions and firms relying on accounting
information are deemed to suffer from information asymmetry pro-
blem. We argue that productivity, especially TFP, is a good indicator of
firms' true worthiness and cannot be easily manipulated. It helps firms
to suffer less from information asymmetry problem in the financial
markets. Therefore, we want to find out whether productive firms do
get more external finance and in what forms of finance. To our
knowledge, the existing research in the areas of firms' capital structure
mainly focuses on testing firms' financing behaviour given the dis-
advantages of information asymmetries and agency problems etc., but
surprisingly little is known on whether and how firms can relieve such
disadvantage themselves so that they can optimise their financing and
production strategy.
Finally, the seminal work of “Growing like China” by Song,
Storesletten, and Zilobotti (2011) shows that Chinese firms have ex-
perienced an enormous productivity growth and the country has
transformed from a virtually closed economy to a world manufacturing
centre in just three decades, and yet its financial sector is largely un-
derdeveloped and frictional. These authors' theoretical model suggests
that Chinese manufacturing firms are especially interesting for studying
the relationships between productivity and finance under China's eco-
nomic and financial system. The Chinese stock market opened in 1990,
and only became more regulated from 1999, when the China Securities
Acts was put into effect. Firms in China are known to face difficulty in
raising finance (e.g. Allen, Qian, & Qian, 2005; Guariglia et al., 2011;
Poncet, Steingress, & Vandenbussche, 2010). Hence, the Chinese con-
text would precisely suit our research and we test whether higher
productivity brings more external finance to listed Chinese firms, which
are likely to have relatively better quality than other non-listed firms
and already have the access to equity finance. The implications found
from listed firms can be easily extended to other firms, as the latter
would typically suffer more from information asymmetries.
3. The model and estimation methods
In order to test the effects of productivity on firms' external finance,
we first propose the theoretical idea of a framework describing how
firms' productivity may link to their external finance in a sensible way.
Then we establish empirical regression models which are implied by the
framework and consistent with exiting theories.
3.1. The proposed methodological framework
Adopting an assumption that productivity fundamentally defines
heterogeneity across firms (e.g. Melitz, 2003), our key novel idea is that
in a competitive market where firms maximise profits and external
finance providers are risk neutral or averse, firms which do not reach a
critical level of productivity have to exit the market. Firms with an
intermediate level of productivity are able to survive in the market, but
can only rely on their own internal finance, because they are rationed
by external finance providers who disbelieve their ability in generating
sufficient cash flow and find them too risky to lend to or invest in. Firms
with a high level of productivity not only grow in the market, but also
have access to external financial markets, where finance providers find
them trustworthy. This idea is illustrated in Fig. 1, where p⁎ and pe are
the critical productivity levels when firms can survive and start to ac-
cess external finance respectively. This is consistent with Egger and
Keuschnigg (2017)'s model, which shows banks can only break even if
they lend to firms with a minimum productivity. This framework
mainly builds upon the literature of capital market imperfections, and
we assume the effect of productivity is through the channel of relieving
information asymmetry between firms and external financial providers,
which is consistent with Neuhann and Saidi (2018)'s findings. Neuhann
and Saidi (2018) find that when more information becomes available,
banks are willing to lend to productive firms even if they are riskier.
This framework shows that exposure to imperfect financial markets
induces only the most productive firms to access external finance while
simultaneously forcing the least productive firms to exit. Both the exit
of the least productive firms and the additional investment that the
most productive firms are able to undertake using the external finance,
reallocate market shares towards the more productive firms, and
eventually promote an aggregate productivity increase. Our framework
has the empirical implication that firms' productivity should have a
positive effect on their ability in raising external funds through miti-
gating information asymmetry problem. Accordingly, if firms have
demand of external finance for their investment opportunities, we
should observe that higher productivity helps firms to keep higher
leverage, keep higher debt ratio, and issue more new equity (or some
combination of them).2
3.2. Empirical model
Our idea above may lead to the regression model between external
finance and productivity below. Except firms' productivity, the vari-
ables in our equations have been well documented in the capital
Fig. 1. Firm productivity and finance.
Notes: p⁎ is firms' surviving productivity, and pe is the minimum level of pro-
ductivity when firms may start to raise external finance.
2 This is related but different from Ding, Kim, and Zhang (2018)'s inter-
pretation. Ding et al. (2018) use TFP as a supply side measure of firms' in-
vestment opportunities, and found TFP has positive effects on firms' investment.
In their case, firms may or may not need/use external finance for their in-
vestment. Whereas in our case we explicitly test the situation when firms has
the demand of external finance.
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structure literature in determining firms' external finance.
= + + + ++ + + + + + + +
extfinance
a b extfinance b sales b assetgrowth b tangibility
b roa b dep b productivity v v v v e
it
i t it it it
it it it j t p o it
1 , 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 1 7 1
(1)
The extfinance variables, including firm i's total leverage, i.e. the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets, new issue of equity to total assets
ratio,3 and long-term debt to total assets ratio at time t, are used in
separate regressions. We use the same model to compare the effects of
productivity on three forms of external finance. sales is the logarithm of
firm's real sales; assetgrowth is the growth of firm's net fixed assets in
logarithm form from time t-1 to time t; tangibility is firm's ratio of total
tangible assets to total assets; roa is firm's return on assets, which is the
ratio of net profit to total assets; dep is firm's depreciation to total assets
ratio; productivity includes three measures of firm's TFP and firm's la-
bour productivity, which is firm's real sales per employee,4 in separate
regressions. vj, vt, vp and vo are two-digit industry dummies, year
dummies, province dummies, which indicate firms' location, and firms'
ownership dummies respectively. eit is an idiosyncratic error term.
The estimation of TFP is practically difficult as econometricians
cannot observe firms' production decisions and therefore face problems
such as endogenous input choices by firms, and different technology
employed by a firm with multiple products. Therefore, we apply three
popular methods of TFP estimation5 in order to verify the robustness of
our results. First, we use the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP there-
after) method using the revenue function. It uses firms' intermediate
inputs to control for unobserved productivity shock in order to address
the problem of endogenous input choices, as well as the problem of
non-negative and lumpy investment, which was used as the proxy by
Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP thereafter). Second, we use the Wooldridge
(2009)'s GMM method, which further improves the simultaneity issues
in the estimation by LP or OP. Then we use the more recent Ackerberg,
Caves, and Frazer (2015) (ACF hereafter) method, which further ad-
dresses the functional dependence problem suffered by LP and OP
methods by inverting the investment or intermediate demand functions
unconditional on the labour input. They also argue that comparing to
Wooldridge (2009) their method has the advantage of allowing a more
general data-generating process.
Though TFP is believed to be a good measure of manufacturing
firms' productivity (see Syverson, 2011 for a survey), it is not easily
observable or comparable by external finance providers. Therefore, we
also test Eq. (1) using labour productivity, which provides a further
check of the robustness of our findings.
Direct bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977) and borrowing costs asso-
ciated with information asymmetries in the financial markets (Ferri &
Jones, 1979; Titman & Wessels, 1988) mean that it is easier for large
firms to borrow, i.e. to keep high leverage. However, on the other hand,
firms with large sales have more retained earnings, which is a cheap
internal source of finance, and thus have less need of external finance.
We use firms' real sales to proxy firm size and expect it to have either
positive or negative coefficient.
The inclusion of firms' net fixed asset growth is to capture firms'
growth opportunities. The relationship between firms' growth oppor-
tunities and leverage may vary. High growth opportunities may lead to
worse shareholder-bondholder conflict (Myers, 1977), and assets sub-
stitution and dilution (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, firms re-
duce leverage as a response to control the costs associated with these
problems. Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that expected future
growth should be negatively related to long-term debt level due to
agency cost. However, the agency problem is mitigated if firms issue
short-term debt (Myers, 1977). Under the pecking order theory, if firms'
priority is current period investment, firms' leverage will increase with
higher growth opportunities, as firms would finance the current in-
vestment projects with increased debt (Ovtchinnikov, 2010). However,
if firms are more concerned with future investment, they would prefer
to keep current leverage low and reserve their debt capacity in antici-
pation of future finance for investment (Ovtchinnikov, 2010). Using a
dynamic model of investment and financing, Sundaresan, Wang, and
Yang (2015) also show that a rational firm significantly lowers its
leverage in anticipation of future growth. Thus, the sign of the asset
growth variable in our model may be uncertain.
Tangible assets can be used as collateral by lenders and thus firms'
opportunity to engage in asset substitution is reduced (Stulz & Johnson,
1985), which eases the agency problem. This suggests a likely positive
effect of assets tangibility on leverage. However, when firms' leverage is
not too high, managers may tend to consume more than the optimal
level of perquisites, which suggests a negative relation between col-
lateralisable (tangible) capital and leverage (Titman & Wessels, 1988).
Hence, the sign of tangibility variable may be also uncertain. We also
expect the effect of tangibility on firms' equity finance would be un-
certain too. Investors can claim firm's remaining assets after lenders in
case of bankruptcy. On the other hand, investors may prefer firms to
have low tangibility so that more funds may be freed up for profitable
investment, which benefits shareholders more directly than debt-
holders.
Return on assets (ROA) is used to measure firms' profitability.
According to the pecking order theory, profitable firms would have less
need to finance investment projects with more expensive external fi-
nance, and thus have lower leverage. Profitable firms may also use
internal finance to repurchase outstanding equity when their share
price is low according to market timing theory, and have less need of
issuing new equity. On the other hand, under the trade-off theory more
profitable firms have lower potential costs of financial distress, and thus
can utilise more debt to shield against income tax and control the
agency cost of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Thus, debt is more at-
tractive and affordable for more profitable firms, i.e. leverage is higher.
The overall effect of profitability depends on which incentive dom-
inates.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that firms' depreciation is a
corporate tax shield substitute for debt. If firms utilise their deprecia-
tion deductions to shield corporate tax, firms may not try to use debt for
the same purpose given concerns of financial distress risk. This follows
the logic of the trade-off theory. Therefore, we may expect a negative
relationship between depreciation and leverage. Huang and Song
(2006) find a negative relation between such tax shield and the
leverage of Chinese listed firms. However, the effect of depreciation on
firms' new equity might be opposite. High depreciation leads to high
cost in firms' income statement, which leads to lower net income and
lower retained earnings. According to the market timing theory, when
firms are short in their internal source of finance, they have stronger
incentives to issue new equity. Therefore, we may expect a positive
effect of depreciation on firms' new equity.
Industry and time dummies are common in the literature to control
for industry specific characteristics and time effects. There has been
numerous empirical evidence of cross-sectional differences in firms'
capital structure related to industrial effects (e.g. Titman & Wessels,
1988), and positive relation between firms' capital structure and the
average of their industry (e.g. Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim, 1984). The
province dummies are to control the fixed effect associated with firm
location. The Chinese economy has a strong location dimension, where
typically the coastal provinces have more advanced economies than
others do. Provincial authorities have numerous local policies that
shape the economic and legal environment for firms.
3 We define the new equity issues ratio following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler
(2003).
4 More detailed variable definitions can be found in the Appendix A.2.
5 When estimating firms' TFP, we assume endogenous technological progress
following Romer (1990), and Aghion and Howitt (1998).
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Ownership dummies6 account for various managerial incentives
that may affect firms' capital structure especially in the Chinese context.
For example, it is often believed that state firms have easier access to
external finance due to the fact that in the event of bankruptcy state
firms are likely to be bailed out by public finance. Foreign firms often
have access to finance abroad such as funds from their parent compa-
nies and foreign financial institutions, whereas private firms in China
are discriminated in financial markets (Allen et al., 2005). An, Pan, and
Tian (2014) find evidence from Chinese listed firms that ownership
structure has a strong impact on the collateral requirement of firms for
their loans.
The Chinese stock market started with only state firms in the early
1990s, and the state firms dominated the market for many years. As the
privatisation process goes on, both the proportion of state firms in the
stock market and the proportion of state shares in firms keep reducing.
In our sample, the proportion of state firms drops each year from over
60% in 2003 to about 30% in 2016. To further eliminate the influence
of financial privileges that firms with some ownership types may enjoy,
we also test Eq. (1) with domestic private firm sample only. If our re-
sults are also valid for the most disadvantaged group of domestic pri-
vate firms, we may be more confident that the productivity effects are
not driven by some firms' ownership privilege in obtaining external
finance.
= + + + ++ + + ×+ × + + + + +
extfinance
a b extfinance b sales b assetgrowth b tangibility
b roa b dep b productivity Type
b productivity Type v v v v e
1
(1 1)
it
i t it it it
it it it
it j t p o it
1 , 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 1 71 1
72 1
(2)
We then further split the full sample of firm-years by their size and
age together, and their export status by estimating Eq. (2). Type1 is a
dummy variable indicating firms being small and young7 in industry j
and year t, and exporting products overseas in year t in separate re-
gressions. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006) find
strong evidence from a large panel of firms from 80 countries that size
and age are useful indicators of financing constraints. Casey and
O'Toole (2014) also find from Euro area counties that size and age in-
fluence firms accessibility of different types of finance, i.e. larger and
older firms are more likely to use finance of higher pecking order. Thus,
we try to find out whether productivity is more helpful for small young
firms or for larger and/or older firms.
Only productive firms are able to export due to the large sunk cost
of exporting (Melitz, 2003). Therefore, export status could be a natural
indicator of firms' quality. Less financial constraints or more availability
of finance enables export as well (see Wagner, 2014 for early survey,
and Muûls, 2015 among others). The export, productivity and finance
nexus has also been an increasingly popular research area recently, e.g.
Egger and Keuschnigg (2017). We are the first trying to explore further
by testing whether exporters with high productivity get more external
finance. Both size age and exporting status dimensions somewhat in-
dicate firms' perceived or true quality. We are interested to find out how
firms' productivity interact with these measures and exert any effect on
their ability of increasing external finance.
Our regression models are likely to suffer from endogeneity pro-
blems, and we therefore lag all the independent variables by one period
to treat the problem. We further control for the possible simultaneity
and endogeneity problems by using the system generalised method of
moments (GMM), in which we treat all the regressors as endogenous
and instrument them using their own lagged variables.8 Year dummies,
two-digit industry dummies, province dummies and ownership dum-
mies are included in all the regressions and instrument sets. Since fi-
nance measures are found to be able to increase firms' TFP (e.g. Chen &
Guariglia, 2013), we cautiously make sure if productivity helps firms to
increase their external finance, the effects are not driven simply by the
correlations between the two variables. We therefore further establish
the casual effect of productivity on external finance by utilising the
difference-in-difference method following an exogenous industrial
policy shock.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
4.1. Data sample
Our data is from the China stock market financial statements da-
tabase (CSMAR), which contains financial statement information for all
listed firms in China's stock market. Due to accounting standards and
stock market regulation changes, and data collection issues, some of our
key variables only became available from 2003.9 Our sample firms are
manufacturing firms located in 30 provinces or province-equivalent
municipal cities of China.
To control for the bias caused by outliers we winsorise the 1% tails
of the distribution of all variables included in our regressions except the
following. Only the top 1% for the long-term debt (only in the long-
term debt ratio regressions) and depreciation, and their observations
with negative values are winsorised. Only the bottom 1% and the values
larger than 1 of tangibility are winsorised. We leave out firms with less
than three-year consecutive observations, which is a common practice
for dynamic models, as well as firms that do not have complete in-
formation on our regression variables. Finally, our unbalanced panel
covers 1591 listed firms with 12,618 firm-year observations. Our dy-
namic model equation leaves our sample ranging from 2003 to 2016.
Observations in each year range from a minimum of 527 in 2016 to a
maximum of 1468 in 2015.10
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the
variables in the whole sample, and column 2 to 4 report the statistics of
private and the rest of the firm-years. About 45% of the total firm-years
are private.11 The t-tests in column 4, which show the significance of
the mean difference between the private sample in column 2 and the
rest of the sample in column 3, indicate that all variables except ACF
TFP and labour productivity are significantly different between the two
groups. Private firms have lower leverage, long-term debt ratio, sales,
tangibility and depreciation, but they issue more new equity, grow
faster, and are more profitable and more labour intensive comparing
with other firms. Their productivity comparing with other firms is
however ambiguous. The long-term debt dummy shows the proportion
of firms having positive long-term debt. A sizable proportion of firms in
all categories do not have any long-term debt at all, and a significantly
smaller proportion of private firms have any long-term debt than other
firms, which may be due to their inability to borrow, as they are more
likely to be discriminated in the Chinese financial market. This is
6 We include 5 ownership dummies, i.e. 1. central state owned, 2. lower level
state owned, 3. domestic private, 4. foreign including Hong Kong, Taiwan and
Macau, 5. others, which are defined by firms' ultimate controlling shareholders.
7 A firm is defined as small young if its real sales is ranked in the bottom 50
percentile of the real sales distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit industry
and in the same year, and if its age is ranked in the bottom 50 percentile of the
age distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit industry. Firm age is defined at
the beginning of the year.
8 We use the lagged level variables of the endogenous regressors in the dif-
ferenced equations and the lagged difference variables in the level equations as
the instruments.
9 Export data appears in various forms for different firms and is extracted
from a set of assorted firm level information.
10 See the Appendix A.1 for more information on the structure of our panel.
11 Firms' ownerships are defined by their ultimate controlling shareholder.
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consistent with the pecking order theory, which suggests that under
information asymmetries due to the higher costs and uncertainty of
long-term finance, only high quality firms may be able to obtain ex-
ternal long-term finance. Private firms' liquidity and coverage ratio are
more than double of those of others, which might show a better fi-
nancial position of private firms. However, in the meanwhile they could
also indicate precautionary internal finance buffer possibly because
private firms are unable to secure external finance when they need.
Overall, private firms seem to perform better and financially heathier,
even though they seem to be disadvantaged in obtaining external bor-
rowing. Perhaps due to their high labour intensity, private firms' labour
productivity is only marginally higher than others'.
Column 5 to 7 compare small young firm-years with the rest. Small
young firm-years take up about 24.8% of all firm-years. They are much
lower in all three measures of external finance. Only a small proportion
of them have long-term debt. They are also significantly less productive
by all measures of TFP and labour productivity. Their asset growth is
similar with others. They are much less profitable, have lower depre-
ciation and are more labour intensive. Considering their lower external
finance even with higher tangibility, we may suspect that small young
firms do have difficulty in obtaining external finance. Small young firms
are significantly more liquid, though their coverage ratio is similar with
other firms. High liquidity could mean a good internal financial posi-
tion, but on the other hand, it could also be a result of inability of
obtaining external finance and consequently indicates more reliance of
internal finance, especially when these firms also have lower perfor-
mance indicators. Overall, small young firms seem to have worse
quality than others. This important observation may suggest that the
information asymmetry problem may be well at work among China's
listed manufacturing firms, where small young firms suffer more. We
try to explore whether conventional proxies for information asymme-
tries, i.e. firm size and age, would make a difference for the effects of
firm productivity in helping raising external finance.
We also divide our sample firm-years according to whether firms
Table 1
Summary statistics.
All firm-years Private Others Diff.
(p-value)
Small & young Others Diff.
(p-value)
Exporters Non-exporters Diff.
(p-value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Leverage 0.568
(0.346)
0.525
(0.365)
0.603
(0.325)
0. 000 0.469
(0.307)
0.600
(0.352)
0. 000 0.553
(0.326)
0.588
(0.370)
0.000
New equity 0.070
(0.240)
0.089
(0.276)
0.054
(0.205)
0.000 0.054
(0.199)
0.075
(0.252)
0.000 0.075
(0.241)
0.062
(0.239)
0.003
Long-term debt 0.054
(0.094)
0.041
(0.083)
0.064
(0.101)
0.000 0.039
(0.080)
0.059
(0.098)
0.000 0.049
(0.086)
0.060
(0.103)
0.000
Long-term debt dummy 0.586
(0.493)
0.498
(0.500)
0.657
(0.475)
0.000 0.458
(0.498)
0.628
(0.483)
0.000 0.593
(0.491)
0.575
(0.494)
0.039
logtfp (LP) 1.152
(0.231)
1.187
(0.245)
1.123
(0.216)
0.000 1.107
(0.232)
1.167
(0.229)
0.000 1.144
(0.194)
1.164
(0.274)
0.000
logtfp
(Wooldridge GMM)
2.963
(0.109)
2.956
(0.245)
2.968
(0.112)
0.000 2.929
(0.101)
2.974
(0.109)
0.000 2.973
(0.102)
2.949
(0.117)
0.000
logtfp (ACF) 2.190
(0.092)
2.191
(0.105)
2.189
(0.094)
0.125 2.138
(0.082)
2.207
(0.088)
0.000 2.197
(0.080)
2.181
(0.105)
0.000
loglp 8.683
(1.006)
8.691
(0.960)
8.676
(1.042)
0.403 8.224
(0.879)
8.834
(0.999)
0.000 8.734
(0.894)
8.612
(1.136)
0.000
logS 16.297
(1.402)
16.014
(1.274)
16.528
(1.459)
0.000 15.252
(0.774)
16.643
(1.392)
0.000 16.503
(1.266)
16.019
(1.524)
0.000
Asset growth 0.112
(0.377)
0.153
(0.409)
0.079
(0.345)
0. 000 0.117
(0.391)
0.111
(0.372)
0. 388 0.139
(0.354)
0.077
(0.403)
0.000
Tangibility 0.276
(0.160)
0.243
(0.139)
0.303
(0.171)
0.000 0.281
(0.145)
0.275
(0.165)
0.065 0.273
(0.147)
0.281
(0.177)
0.003
ROA 0.028
(0.071)
0.037
(0.068)
0.020
(0.073)
0. 000 0.017
(0.078)
0.031
(0.068)
0. 000 0.031
(0.063)
0.023
(0.081)
0.000
Depreciation 0.028
(0.017)
0.026
(0.016)
0.031
(0.018)
0.000 0.026
(0.015)
0.029
(0.018)
0.000 0.029
(0.017)
0.028
(0.018)
0.000
Labour intensity 0.106
(0.072)
0.109
(0.073)
0.103
(0.071)
0.000 0.118
(0.067)
0.102
(0.073)
0.000 0.108
(0.066)
0.103
(0.079)
0.001
Liquidity 0.140
(0.267)
0.205
(0.265)
0.086
(0.258)
0.000 0.186
(0.286)
0.124
(0.259)
0.000 0.161
(0.245)
0.111
(0.292)
0.000
Coverage ratio 0.147
(0.311)
0.205
(0.362)
0.100
(0.253)
0.000 0.154
(0.353)
0.145
(0.297)
0.134 0.153
(0.291)
0.139
(0.337)
0.018
Number of observations 12,618 5672
(45.0%)
6946
(55.0%)
3132
(24.8%)
9486
(75.2%)
7246
(57.4%)
5372
(42.6%)
Notes: The table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 1% tails of the distribution of each variable in the table have been
winsorised. Leverage is firms' total liability to total assets ratio; new equity, firms' ratio of (changes in total shareholder's equity - changes in retained earnings)/total
assets; long-term debt, firms' outstanding long-term debt to total assets ratio; long-term debt dummy equals 1 if firm i has positive long-term debt in year t, and 0
otherwise; logtfp, logarithm of firm's total factor productivity; loglp, logarithm of real sales per employee; logS, logarithm of real sales; asset growth, the difference of
logarithms of firms' real net fixed assets from time t-1 to t; tangibility, total tangible assets/total assets; ROA, firm's return on assets= net profit/total assets;
depreciation, depreciation/total assets; labour intensity= total wage bill/sales; liquidity, (current assets – current liabilities)/total assets; coverage ratio, net profit to
current liabilities ratio. LP, Wooldridge GMM and ACF are the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the Wooldridge (2009) and the Ackerberg et al. (2015) methods of
estimating TFP respectively. The currency unit is RMB yuan (the average exchange rate was approximately of USD: RMB=1:6.3). See the Appendix for precise
definitions of all variables. Diff. reports the p-values of the t-test statistics for the equality of means. Private firms are defined according to firms' ultimate controlling
shareholders. A firm is defined as small and young if its real sales is ranked in the bottom 50 percentile of the real sales distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit
industry and in the same year, and if its age is ranked in the bottom 50 percentile of the age distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit industry. Firm is defined an
exporter if it has positive overseas sales in year t.
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export to overseas markets in a particular year.12 57.4% of our sample
firm-years export and 42.6% do not. All of our indicators are sig-
nificantly different between exporters and non-exporters. Exporters
have higher leverage and long-term debt, but lower new equity. There
are a bigger proportion of exporters having positive long-term debt than
non-exporters. Exporters are generally more productive than non-ex-
porters by three out of four measures of productivity. Their sales size is
larger, asset growth almost double of the non-exporters, and their
profitability much higher. Exporters are less tangible on average. Their
depreciation is only slightly higher. They also have much higher li-
quidity and coverage ratio. Overall, exporting manufacturing firms in
our sample seem to have better quality, and with better internal fi-
nancial position, they seem to rely more on equity finance, but do not
seem to use more borrowing.
Generally, the descriptive statistics provide some preliminary evi-
dence that higher productivity tend to be associated with higher equity
finance, but not necessarily with higher leverage or long-term debt. The
characteristics of firm ownership, size and age, export status all play a
role in influencing firms' performance and finance. We also notice that
in our sample high growth firms tend to have less long-term debt, which
is in line with Barclay and Smith's (1995) finding that high growth firms
prefer to use short-term debt.
5. Results
In this section, we provide a more detailed analysis of the link be-
tween productivity and external finance, and the extent to which the
characteristics of firm ownership, size and age, and export status affect
the sensitivity of three forms of external finance, i.e. total leverage, new
equity and long-term debt, to productivity, i.e. three measures of TFP as
well as labour productivity.
5.1. Productivity effects on firms' total leverage
First, in column 1 to 3 of Table 2 we estimate Eq. (1) with three
measures of TFP and total leverage and show the results for the full
sample. Only Wooldridge TFP has a significant positive effect on firms'
total leverage. In column 4 of Table 2 we show the full sample results
using labour productivity, which has no effect on firms' leverage. La-
bour productivity does not measure other aspects of firms' efficiency
than the labour input, but it can be easily measured and readily
available to external finance providers. However, the simple measure-
ment of labour productivity may bias towards capital-intensive firms.
Especially the Chinese export sector is dominated by labour intensive
industries, which are better at producing labour intensive goods than
non-exporters, but they might not be efficient in terms of other aspects
of production. Therefore, to account for the possible differences of la-
bour intensity when examining the effect of labour productivity, we add
a ratio of firms' total wage bill to sales to the labour productivity re-
gressions.
To further eliminate potential influence of firms' ownerships, we
produce the above regressions on private firm sample and report the
results in column 5 to 8 in Table 2. Only the Wooldridge and ACF TFP
have significant positive effects on leverage, and it is evident that these
results are not subject to firms' ownership influence.
Other variables are all reasonable and remarkably consistent be-
tween the whole and private samples. The lagged leverage variable has
a large positive and significant coefficient suggesting an obvious dy-
namic behaviour. The effect of firm size is not totally clear as suggested
by different regressions. While large firms may be able to borrow more
since they are less likely to suffer from information asymmetry pro-
blems, they may also be more self-sufficient and rely less on external
borrowing. Fixed asset growth has negative significant effects on
leverage, which is consistent with the prediction of agency theory,
where high growth firms prefer to reduce leverage to control for agency
cost associated with managers' misbehaviour arising from the growth
opportunities (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Tangibility also plays a sig-
nificant positive role in determining leverage, as tangible assets could
serve as collateral for external finance. Profitability has a negative but
insignificant effect. Depreciation ratio, to control the possibility that
firms may depreciate their assets to shield off some tax instead of using
debt for the same purpose, also reduces leverage as expected.
m3 and Hansen tests show that all of our system GMM regressions
are appropriate. Overall, we find some positive effects of productivity
on firms' leverage. To further verify the robustness of this result, we also
use the change of total leverage, current leverage and short-term debt
ratio as the dependent variables. Since an increase in total leverage
could be due to an increase in total liabilities or a decrease in total
assets, using total leverage as a measure may not correctly capture
firms' borrowing behaviour. Therefore, we also use the change of total
liabilities over total assets ratio, and the results in Table A4 is re-
markably consistent with Table 2. Results in Tables A5 and A6 also
show that productivity has little effect in helping firms with short-term
borrowing. This is reasonable, as short-term lenders might not worry
about firms' long-term performance like productivity, instead they
would care more about firms' ability in repaying the debts in the short
term like some balance sheet indicators.
5.2. Productivity effects on firms' new issue of equity
Though equity finance may be less favoured than debt finance by
firms since issuing new equity is more costly according to the pecking
order theory, our sample firms on average have a total shareholders'
equity to total assets ratio of 0.413, whereas their average total out-
standing long-term debt to total assets ratio is only 0.054. As shown in
Table 1 new issue of equity ratio is higher than long-term debt ratio for
every category of firms. It seems that equity finance is a highly im-
portant form of external finance for Chinese listed firms. Therefore, it is
vital for us to explore how productivity affects different types of ex-
ternal finance.
In Table 3 we find highly significant and positive productivity ef-
fects for firms' new equity in all the regressions, suggesting high pro-
ductivity helps firms to raise more equity finance. Comparing with
Table 2, the coefficients of some of the control variables have opposite
signs, i.e. the lagged new equity variable, ROA and depreciation ratio,
but are still all reasonable. The lagged new equity variable is negative
and significant in all the regressions, which suggests a correction be-
haviour of firms' new equity issues, as firms often wish to maintain a
smooth stream of new equity issuance (Bolton, Chen, & Wang, 2013).
Comparing with Table 2, ROA has a positive effect instead, which is
sensible. High profit could be a substitute for debt, but more attractive
to investors and makes issuing new equity easy. Depreciation is positive
and significant as expected, opposite its signs in the leverage regres-
sions in Table 2. While depreciation is an alternative tax shield sub-
stituting for debt, it reduces retained earnings and induces firms to issue
equity. Again, the private firm sample has highly consistent results with
the whole sample, and all the tests show our regressions are appro-
priate. We seem to find strong evidence that equity finance goes to the
more productive firms.
5.3. Productivity effects on firms' long-term debt
We then further explore the effect of productivity on another major
form of external finance, long-term debt, which is defined as firms'
borrowing from banks or other financial institutions with a maturity
12 Some of our sample firms do switch between exporters and non-exporters,
but it is extremely rare that they changed frequently or dramatically in terms of
export sales during the sample period. In order to capture particularly firms'
switch from non-exporter to exporter, which is likely due to productivity im-
provement according to Melitz (2003), we define firms' export status by year.
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Table 2
The effect of productivity on total leverage.
Dependent variable: leverageit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
leveragei,t-1 0.685⁎⁎⁎
(0.040)
0.664⁎⁎⁎
(0.039)
0.658⁎⁎⁎
(0.040)
0.646⁎⁎⁎
(0.041)
0.785⁎⁎⁎
(0.054)
0.750⁎⁎⁎
(0.057)
0.647⁎⁎⁎
(0.049)
0.730⁎⁎⁎
(0.053)
logSit-1 0.015⁎
(0.007)
−0.051⁎⁎
(0.021)
−0.002
(0.009)
0.027⁎⁎⁎
(0.008)
0.005
(0.012)
−0.076⁎⁎
(0.032)
−0.019
(0.012)
0.009
(0.016)
asset growthit-1 −0.187⁎⁎⁎
(0.031)
−0.206⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.214⁎⁎⁎
(0.031)
−0.196⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.239⁎⁎⁎
(0.046)
−0.262⁎⁎⁎
(0.045)
−0.211⁎⁎⁎
(0.031)
−0.217⁎⁎⁎
(0.045)
tangibilityit-1 0.493⁎⁎⁎
(0.116)
0.622⁎⁎⁎
(0.124)
0.591⁎⁎⁎
(0.136)
0.524⁎⁎⁎
(0.116)
0.574⁎⁎⁎
(0.200)
0.699⁎⁎⁎
(0.201)
0.702⁎⁎⁎
(0.193)
0.629⁎⁎⁎
(0.186)
roait-1 −0.047
(0.210)
−0.281
(0.176)
−0.186
(0.176)
0.050
(0.170)
−0.241
(0.320)
−0.392
(0.294)
−0.251
(0.219)
0.041
(0.274)
depit-1 −5.855⁎⁎⁎
(0.988)
−5.540⁎⁎⁎
(1.005)
−5.629⁎⁎⁎
(0.965)
−5.841⁎⁎⁎
(0.991)
−7.520⁎⁎⁎
(2.128)
−7.861⁎⁎⁎
(2.219)
−5.985⁎⁎⁎
(1.447)
−7.548⁎⁎⁎
(1.981)
logtfpit-1 −0.021
(0.072)
1.734⁎⁎⁎
(0.627)
0.340
(0.228)
0.069
(0.083)
2.156⁎⁎
(0.924)
0.506⁎
(0.275)
labour intensityit-1 0.488⁎⁎
(0.224)
0.310
(0.371)
loglpit-1 −0.009
(0.015)
0.000
(0.027)
m3 (p-value) 0.240 0.287 0.272 0.208 0.645 0.609 0.683 0.684
J (Hansen) 0.144 0.140 0.163 0.185 0.509 0.534 0.983 0.191
IVs (lags) t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
number of observations 12,618 12,623 12,623 12,624 5672 5674 5674 5676
Notes: All specifications were estimated using system GMM estimators. i indexes firms; and t, time. All the regressions include year dummies, industry dummies which
are at 2 digit level, and province dummies which indicate the location of firms' headquarter. The whole sample regressions also include ownership dummies. The
figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. m3 are tests for third-order serial correlations in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. J tests show the validity of the instrument sets. ⁎ indicates significance at the 10% level. ⁎⁎ indicates
significance at the 5% level. ⁎⁎⁎ indicates significance at the 1% level. Also see Notes to Table 1.
Table 3
The effect of productivity on new equity.
Dependent variable: new equityit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new equityi,t-1 −0.086⁎⁎
(0.036)
−0.023
(0.069)
−0.109⁎⁎⁎
(0.042)
−0.050
(0.040)
−0.080⁎
(0.046)
−0.134⁎⁎⁎
(0.051)
0.126
(0.084)
0.050
(0.056)
logSit-1 −0.022⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.116⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.075⁎⁎⁎
(0.011)
−0.042⁎⁎⁎
(0.008)
−0.037⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
−0.154⁎⁎⁎
(0.041)
−0.079⁎⁎⁎
(0.016)
−0.043⁎⁎⁎
(0.014)
asset growthit-1 −0.042⁎
(0.023)
−0.069⁎
(0.036)
−0.012
(0.027)
−0.060⁎⁎
(0.024)
−0.047⁎
(0.025)
−0.016
(0.033)
−0.151⁎⁎⁎
(0.046)
−0.083⁎⁎
(0.033)
tangibilityit-1 0.068
(0.098)
0.375⁎
(0.194)
0.345⁎⁎⁎
(0.132)
−0.049
(0.109)
0.184
(0.172)
−0.101
(0.261)
0.763⁎⁎⁎
(0.290)
0.330
(0.203)
roait-1 0.113
(0.181)
0.730⁎⁎⁎
(0.260)
0.357⁎
(0.190)
0.163
(0.172)
0.170
(0.199)
0.188
(0.239)
0.807⁎⁎⁎
(0.315)
0.347
(0.271)
depit-1 1.412⁎
(0.855)
−0.370
(1.719)
1.448
(0.933)
2.387⁎⁎⁎
(0.908)
1.405
(1.580)
3.742⁎
(1.965)
−2.938
(2.358)
−0.810
(1.841)
logtfpit-1 0.143⁎⁎
(0.057)
2.459⁎⁎⁎
(0.864)
1.102⁎⁎⁎
(0.226)
0.202⁎⁎⁎
(0.074)
3.118⁎⁎⁎
(1.029)
0.823⁎⁎⁎
(0.298)
labour intensityit-1 0.012
(0.209)
0.406
(0.345)
loglpit-1 0.050⁎⁎⁎
(0.014)
0.053⁎⁎⁎
(0.019)
m2 (p-value) 0.611 0.430 0.401 0.511
m3 (p-value) 0.690 0.849 0.781
m4 (p-value) 0.917
J (Hansen) 0.158 0.112 0.063 0.217 0.153 0.527 0.261 0.210
IVs (lags) t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-4,…
Δt-3…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
number of observations 12,611 12,616 12,616 12,617 5672 5674 5674 5676
Notes: see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
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over a year. Such long-term debt would be costly for firms to obtain.
Figures in Table 1 show that our sample firms' long-term debt is only
about 10% of their total liabilities13 on average for all categories of
firms. On the other hand, short-term finance such as trade credit and
overdraft credit lines would be relatively easy to get and do not ne-
cessarily involves borrowers' particular effort for each borrowing. Thus,
it is important to check firms' long-term debt without the influence of
other forms of more easily accessible short-term finance.
Table 4 shows the effects of productivity on firms' long-term debt.
Only LP TFP and labour productivity models for the whole sample, and
ACF TFP and labour productivity models for the private sample show
positive significant productivity effects. All other control variables
show sensible and consistent results in both samples. All the tests
suggest our regression models are appropriate. Overall, our results
suggest that productivity helps firms to raise long-term debt to some
extent, but the effect is not as strong as the one on firms' new equity
finance.
In general, we find that productivity does help firms to raise ex-
ternal finance, especially new equity finance, but the effect is slightly
weaker on leverage and long-term debt. To check more robustness of
our results, we also use the three-year moving average of all the four
measures of productivity as our dependent variables, so that our results
are more independent from the volatility of productivity, i.e. less in-
fluenced by the predictability of past productivity for future pro-
ductivity. As showed in Tables A7, A8 and A9 the productivity effects
are consistent and even much stronger.
5.4. Does the productivity effect vary?
Now we try to explore in more details whether the productivity and
external finance nexus differ along some dimensions of firm
characteristics. First, we split our sample firms by their size and age
together. Firms, which are in the lower half of the distribution of both
real sales and age of all the firms in the same year and same industry,
are classified as small young firms.14 Small young firms in our sample
indeed have less external finance, and lower values in performance
indicators than others as shown in Table 1.
Then we also split our sample into exporters and non-exporter.
Many foreign invested manufacturing firms in low labour cost countries
are established with the sole purpose of exporting their products back to
foreign markets, which suggest that these firms do not have to bear the
sunk cost of export and may not necessarily have better quality than
their domestic counterparts. However, we do not have such concern,
since 95.75% of our sample firms are domestic firms,15 i.e. exporters in
our sample are most likely to be the genuine productive exporters as
Melitz (2003) models. Figures in Table 1 show that exporters and non-
exporters are highly distinctive from each other, and exporters do seem
to have better performance.
Table 5 presents the results of Eq. (2). Big and/or old firms have a
positive significant productivity effect on their leverage only by the
Wooldridge TFP regression in column 2, where large and/or old firms
have a significantly higher TFP effects on their leverage than small
young firms as shown by the significant χ2 statistics. Exporters show
some marginally higher positive significant TFP effects on leverage than
non-exporters by the Wooldridge and ACF TFP regressions in column 6
and 7. These results are much in line with the whole sample results in
Table 2. Labour productivity has no effect on leverage for any of the
firm groups. All the tests show that our regressions are reasonable, and
control variables are all sensible too. Overall, we see some weak evi-
dence that it is the better quality firm groups being able to utilise TFP to
increase leverage, and labour productivity does not seem to help.
Table 4
The effect of productivity on long-term debt.
Dependent variable: ltdit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ltdi,t-1 0.689⁎⁎⁎
(0.029)
0.814⁎⁎⁎
(0.038)
0.821⁎⁎⁎
(0.040)
0.675⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
0.602⁎⁎⁎
(0.050)
0.631⁎⁎⁎
(0.051)
0.551⁎⁎⁎
(0.039)
0.527⁎⁎⁎
(0.041)
logSit-1 −0.001
(0.002)
0.005
(0.011)
−0.004
(0.003)
−4.57e-3
(0.002)
0.007⁎⁎
(0.003)
0.016
(0.011)
0.003
(0.003)
0.005
(0.003)
asset growthit-1 −0.013
(0.008)
−0.014
(0.012)
−0.016
(0.013)
−0.012
(0.008)
−0.028⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
−0.016
(0.010)
−0.021⁎⁎⁎
(0.006)
−0.022⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
tangibilityit-1 0.076⁎⁎
(0.030)
0.017
(0.057)
0.031
(0.056)
0.071⁎⁎
(0.029)
0.089⁎⁎
(0.038)
0.041
(0.050)
0.100⁎⁎
(0.043)
0.097⁎⁎⁎
(0.032)
roait-1 0.129⁎⁎
(0.056)
0.205⁎⁎⁎
(0.077)
0.200⁎⁎
(0.077)
0.144⁎⁎
(0.051)
0.050
(0.061)
0.024
(0.069)
0.044
(0.045)
0.087⁎
(0.046)
depit-1 −0.511⁎⁎
(0.215)
−0.033
(0.405)
−0.041
(0.398)
−0.454⁎⁎
(0.226)
−1.391⁎⁎⁎
(0.391)
−0.774⁎⁎
(0.403)
−1.182⁎⁎⁎
(0.308)
−1.285⁎⁎⁎
(0.292)
logtfpit-1 0.032⁎
(0.018)
−0.131
(0.206)
0.094
(0.073)
0.019
(0.021)
−0.244
(0.219)
0.122⁎
(0.066)
labour intensityit-1 0.156⁎⁎⁎
(0.058)
0.068
(0.060)
loglpit-1 0.012⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.009⁎⁎
(0.04)
m2 (p-value) 0.762 0.410 0.725 0.814
m3 (p-value) 0.257 0.194 0.197 0.241
J (Hansen) 0.391 0.327 0.265 0.251 0.475 0.538 0.157 0.739
IVs (lags) t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
number of observations 12,402 12,407 12,407 12,408 5564 5566 5566 5568
Notes: see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
13 We use the long-term debt ratio in the 3rd row of Table 1 to divide the
leverage in the 1st row to calculate the relative size of long-term debt to total
liabilities.
14 Firms' size and age effects are related to the nature of the industry, business
cycle, life cycle of the industry etc. Therefore, we take into account of industry
and year when defining firms to be small and young.
15 More details of the ownership structure of our sample firm-years can be
found in Table A3 in the Appendix.
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Table 6 shows the sample splitting tests of Eq. (2) on firms' new
equity. All groups of firms attract positive and highly significant pro-
ductivity effects on new equity. It is the big and/or old firms and ex-
porters always have stronger effects than their respective counterparts,
as shown by the significant χ2 tests for all the regressions. The results
are persistent and robust. Again, all the tests indicate appropriate re-
gressions. Therefore, we may be confident to summarise that pro-
ductivity helps firms to raise new equity finance. Big and/or old firms
and exporters are able to better utilise productivity to issue more new
equities than small young firms and non-exporters respectively.
Finally, Table 7 shows the test results of productivity on firms' long-
term debt ratio. All measures of TFP do not seem to have any effect on
firms' long-term debt borrowing for all the groups. However, column 4
shows that big and/or old firms have a significantly higher labour
productivity effect on long-term debt than small young firms. Column 8
shows that labour productivity helps both exporter and non-exporters
to raise long-term debt, though the effects are similar. Again, all of our
control variables are reasonable and regression models are all appro-
priate.
6. Exogenous policy shock
Despite the advantage of system GMM estimator in controlling en-
dogeneity problems in our models, we make use of an exogenous in-
dustrial policy shock on productivity of firms in some sectors and use a
difference-in-difference (DID hereafter) approach to shed some further
lights on the causality between productivity and external finance.
The Chinese policy makers believe that some industrial sectors have
produced far more than the demand of the market, and have been
trying to intervene in the production market. The Chinese government
issued the ‘Notice of the State Council on Further Strengthening the
Elimination of Backward Production Capacities’ (No. 7 [2010] of the
State Council) (the Notice hereafter) in June 2010.16 This Notice aims
to reduce production in sectors including electricity, coke, iron and
steel, nonferrous metal, construction materials (particularly cement),
some light industries (mainly paper making and leather), and textile. It
details various means by the government in an attempt to reduce output
in those sectors, such as direct closure and demolishing of production
facilities and equipment, increasing the entry requirement, environ-
mental standards, product standards, and monitoring, and etc. For ex-
ample, the Notice requires firms must retire some production lines with
certain old technologies or of very small production capacity. Such
measures by the government would damage the productivity in those
industries and are completely out of the control of the firms, and we
thus may regard it as an exogenous shock to the firms and expect a drop
in productivity for firms in those affected industries.
Following Ding et al. (2018) we use a DID approach to explore the
effects of such exogenous shock on firms' external finance by estimating
the following equation.= + + + × + + +extfinance Treat Postpolicy Treat Postpolicy v v eit i t i t p o it
(3)
where extfinanceit includes total leverage, new equity and long-term
debt variables respectively in separate regressions. Treati is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if firm i is from the treatment group, i.e. in one of the
industries that are affected by the policy,17 and 0 otherwise. Postpolicyt
Table 5
The effect of productivity on total leverage.
Dependent variable: leverageit Small & young/others Exporters/non-exporters
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
leveragei,t-1 0.691⁎⁎⁎
(0.042)
0.645⁎⁎⁎
(0.040)
0.639⁎⁎⁎
(0.041)
0.645⁎⁎⁎
(0.042)
0.667⁎⁎⁎
(0.043)
0.644⁎⁎⁎
(0.043)
0.642⁎⁎⁎
(0.043)
0.679⁎⁎⁎
(0.045)
logSit-1 0.017⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.039⁎
(0.020)
−0.000
(0.009)
0.026⁎⁎⁎
(0.008)
0.022⁎⁎
(0.008)
−0.046⁎
(0.024)
−0.001
(0.033)
0.034⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
asset growthit-1 −0.192⁎⁎⁎
(0.031)
−0.204⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
−0.206⁎⁎⁎
(0.029)
−0.199⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.194⁎⁎⁎
(0.032)
−0.228⁎⁎⁎
(0.032)
−0.232⁎⁎⁎
(0.033)
−0.200⁎⁎⁎
(0.036)
tangibilityit-1 0.493⁎⁎
(0.120)
0.622⁎⁎⁎
(0.116)
0.580⁎⁎⁎
(0.127)
0.542⁎⁎⁎
(0.111)
0.500⁎⁎⁎
(0.119)
0.636⁎⁎⁎
(0.126)
0.599⁎⁎⁎
(0.140)
0.448⁎⁎⁎
(0.119)
roait-1 −0.155⁎⁎⁎
(0.215)
−0.299⁎
(0.162)
−0.237
(0.166)
−0.003
(0.162)
−0.086
(0.233)
−0.320⁎
(0.191)
−0.280
(0.196)
−0.110
(0.198)
depit-1 −6.058⁎⁎⁎
(0.977)
−5.715⁎⁎⁎
(0.965)
−5.716⁎⁎⁎
(0.924)
−6.072⁎⁎⁎
(0.928)
−6.398⁎⁎⁎
(0.974)
−6.298⁎⁎⁎
(0.997)
−6.223⁎⁎⁎
(0.966)
−5.962⁎⁎⁎
(1.019)
logtfpit-1× type1 −0.027
(0.076)
1.351⁎⁎
(0.606)
0.209
(0.214)
−0.013
(0.081)
1.770⁎⁎
(0.700)
0.425⁎
(0.242)
logtfpit-1× (1-type1) −0.004
(0.073)
1.362⁎⁎
(0.604)
0.228
(0.212)
−0.027
(0.076)
1.759⁎⁎
(0.699)
0.413⁎
(0.239)
labour intensityit-1 0.358
(0.221)
−6.398⁎⁎⁎
(0.974)
loglpit-1× type1 −0.024
(0.015)
−0.013
(0.081)
loglpit-1× (1-type1) −0.020
(0.015)
−0.027
(0.076)
m3 (p-value) 0.234 0.281 0.263 0.209 0.249 0.303 0.278 0.249
J (Hansen) 0.141 0.126 0.178 0.097 0.196 0.222 0.259 0.196
IVs (lags) t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
χ2 (p-value) 0.186 0.091 0.033 0.039 0.473 0.164 0.263 0.473
number of observations 12,618 12,623 12,623 12,624 12,618 12,623 12,623 12,618
Notes: In column 1–4, type1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i belong to the group of small young firms, and 0 otherwise. In column 5–8, type1 is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if firm i exports in year t, and 0 otherwise. χ2 tests the differentiated TFP effects under H0: logtfpit-1× type1= logtfpit-1× (1-type1). A significant
χ2 indicates different TFP effects for the two corresponding groups of firms. Also see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
16 The full text of the Notice in Chinese is available in the Chinese central
government website http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-04/06/content_1573880.
htm
17 In our sample the treatment group includes firms in the following in-
dustries: cement and asbestine cement products; coking; metal products; paper
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Table 6
The effect of productivity on new equity.
Dependent variable: new equityit Small & young/others Exporters/non-exporters
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new equityi,t-1 −0.081⁎⁎
(0.040)
−0.131⁎⁎⁎
(0.040)
−0.119⁎⁎⁎
(0.038)
−0.065
(0.040)
−0.040
(0.062)
−0.093⁎⁎
(0.044)
−0.092⁎⁎
(0.045)
−0.022
(0.052)
logSit-1 −0.027⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.095⁎⁎⁎
(0.023)
−0.071⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
−0.043⁎⁎⁎
(0.008)
−0.016⁎
(0.009)
−0.109⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
−0.074⁎⁎⁎
(0.012)
−0.038⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
asset growthit-1 −0.004
(0.024)
−0.026
(0.024)
−0.013
(0.024)
−0.045⁎
(0.023)
−0.132⁎⁎⁎
(0.033)
−0.080⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.069⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.116⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
tangibilityit-1 0.178⁎
(0.100)
0.144
(0.119)
0.318⁎⁎⁎
(0.121)
0.028
(0.112)
−0.026
(0.143)
0.236⁎
(0.142)
0.374⁎⁎
(0.157)
−0.036
(0.149)
roait-1 0.052
(0.179)
0.419⁎⁎
(0.177)
0.383⁎⁎
(0.179)
0.130
(0.166)
0.069
(0.267)
0.349
(0.220)
0.266
(0.227)
0.168
(0.242)
depit-1 0.854⁎
(0.892)
1.214
(0.888)
1.093
(0.891)
1.898⁎⁎
(0.934)
1.190
(1.384)
−0.002
(1.108)
0.226
(1.139)
1.689
(1.341)
logtfpit-1× type1 0.071
(0.056)
1.711⁎⁎
(0.660)
0.884⁎⁎⁎
(0.213)
0.208⁎⁎
(0.084)
2.260⁎⁎⁎
(0.763)
1.077⁎⁎⁎
(0.245)
logtfpit-1× (1-type1) 0.138⁎⁎
(0.055)
1.729⁎⁎⁎
(0.659)
0.911⁎⁎⁎
(0.211)
0.144⁎
(0.080)
2.246⁎⁎⁎
(0.761)
1.054⁎⁎⁎
(0.242)
labour intensityit-1 −0.009
(0.198)
0.439
(0.247)
loglpit-1× type1 0.041⁎⁎⁎
(0.013)
0.082⁎⁎⁎
(0.017)
loglpit-1× (1-type1) 0.048⁎⁎⁎
(0.014)
0.075⁎⁎⁎
(0.017)
m2 (p-value) 0.746 0.713 0.846 0.499
m3 (p-value) 0.723 0.860 0.777 0.998
J (Hansen) 0.159 0.118 0.172 0.235 0.185 0.079 0.102 0.125
IVs(lags) t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
χ2(p-value) 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.087 0.036 0.008
number of observations 12,611 12,616 12,616 12,617 12,611 12,616 12,616 12,617
Notes: See notes to Tables 1, 2 and 5.
Table 7
The effect of productivity on long-term debt.
Dependent variable: ltdit Small & young/others Exporters/non-exporters
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ltdi,t-1 0.675⁎⁎⁎
(0.029)
0.683⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
0.682⁎⁎⁎
(0.028)
0.665⁎⁎⁎
(0.029)
0.790⁎⁎⁎
(0.044)
0.687⁎⁎⁎
(0.029)
0.684⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
0.673⁎⁎⁎
(0.033)
logSit-1 −0.002
(0.002)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.002)
−0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
asset growthit-1 −0.014⁎
(0.008)
−0.013⁎
(0.007)
−0.012⁎
(0.008)
−0.010
(0.008)
−0.018
(0.014)
−0.015*
(0.008)
−0.013
(0.008)
−0.017⁎
(0.010)
tangibilityit-1 0.076⁎⁎
(0.029)
0.062⁎⁎
(0.031)
0.076⁎⁎
(0.033)
0.057⁎
(0.031)
−0.014
(0.059)
0.049
(0.037)
0.063
(0.041)
0.065⁎
(0.034)
roait-1 0.157⁎⁎⁎
(0.053)
0.171⁎⁎⁎
(0.048)
0.166⁎⁎⁎
(0.048)
0.165⁎⁎⁎
(0.054)
0.258⁎⁎⁎
(0.097)
0.155⁎⁎⁎
(0.056)
0.139⁎⁎
(0.055)
0.146⁎⁎
(0.066)
depit-1 −0.561⁎⁎⁎
(0.211)
−0.477⁎⁎
(0.213)
−0.529⁎⁎
(0.203)
−0.455⁎
(0.242)
0.050
(0.463)
−0.427⁎
(0.232)
−0.494⁎⁎
(0.225)
−0.577⁎⁎
(0.268)
logtfpit-1× type1 0.021
(0.018)
−0.003
(0.163)
0.032
(0.056)
−0.008
(0.029)
0.066
(0.181)
0.040
(0.064)
logtfpit-1× (1-type1) 0.027
(0.018)
−0.001
(0.163)
0.036
(0.055)
0.001
(0.026)
0.068
(0.181)
0.042
(0.064)
labour intensityit-1 0.111⁎
(0.063)
0.168⁎⁎
(0.069)
loglpit-1× type1 0.008⁎
(0.004)
1.075e-1⁎⁎
(4.91e-2)
loglpit-1× (1-type1) 0.009⁎⁎
(0.004)
1.155e-1⁎⁎
(4.83e-2)
m3 (p-value) 0.275 0.278 0.286 0.252 0.173 0.240 0.253 0.221
J (Hansen) 0.356 0.301 0.163 0.366 0.873 0.445 0.310 0.412
IVs(lags) t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
χ2(p-value) 0.154 0.145 0.085 0.029 0.327 0.537 0.451 0.315
number of observations 12,402 12,407 12,407 12,408 12,402 12,407 12,407 12,408
Notes: See notes to Tables 1, 2 and 5.
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is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in the post-treat-
ment period, i.e. in or after 2012. The Notice specifies that those pro-
ductivity-damaging measures in those industries have to be im-
plemented by the end of 2011.18 Therefore, we regard 2010 and 2011
as our treatment period, and 2012 onwards as post-treatment period.
We also include province and ownership dummies, vp and vo. eit is an
idiosyncratic error term. The strict exogenous assumption of DID im-
plies that θ is the DID treatment effect of the policy shock we examine,
i.e. the effect of the policy on the treatment group. Specifically,
= = == = = == =
E extfinance Treat Postpolicy E extfinance Treat
Postpolicy
E extfinance Treat Postpolicy E extfinance Treat
Postpolicy
{ [ | 1, 1] [ |
1, 0]}
{ [ | 0, 1] [ |
0, 0]}
it i t it i
t
it i t it i
t
(4)
β is the difference between the treatment and non-treatment groups
during the pre-policy period, i.e. 2009 and before, and γ is the change
after the implementation of the policy for the non-treatment group.
More specifically,
= = == =extfinance Treat Postpolicy extfinance TreatPostpolicyE[ | 1, 0] E[ |0, 0]it i t it it (5)
= = == =extfinance Treat Postpolicy extfinance TreatPostpolicyE[ | 0, 1] E[ |0, 0]it i t it it (6)
The results of the DID regressions in Eq. (3) are reported in Table 8.
Before the policy shock, firms in the treatment sectors have 4.1% and
2.7% (β) higher leverage and long-term debt respectively, but 2.4% less
new equity comparing to firms in other sectors. The policy shock has a
particularly significant negative effect on firms' long-term debt, which
is reduced by 2.6% (γ+ θ) in those treatment industries compared to
the pre-policy period. The reduction is also 1.7% (θ) more than firms in
other non-treatment industries. However, the treatment effect (θ) for
the total leverage and new equity is not particularly obvious.
We then split our sample into small young firms versus other firms
and exporters versus non-exporters, and run the regressions of Eq. (3)
for each type of external finance. The results are presented in Table 9.
The policy shock does not have a significant treatment effect (θ) on
leverage for all the sub-groups as shown in column 1 and 2. In the new
equity regressions in panel A of column 3 and 4, large and/or old firms
have a strong treatment effect, whereas small young firms do not. In
panel B, neither exporters nor non-exporters have any significant
treatment effects. In column 5 and 6, large and/or old firms have a
significant negative treatment effect on long-term debt, whereas small
young firms do not. Exporters have a significant negative treatment
effect on long-term debt, whereas non-exporters do not. These results
are consistent with our GMM regression results, i.e. the external finance
of large and/or old firms and exporters is more responsive to their
productivity.
Overall, our DID results confirm the causality from productivity to
external finance, and provide additional support for the validity of our
main GMM regression results. In particular, we find this productivity-
damaging policy significantly reduces external finance for firms in the
affected industries relative to other firms. Such effects exist for the
better quality large and/old firms and exporters, but not for their re-
spective counterparts.
7. Conclusion
Using a panel of 1591 Chinese listed manufacturing firms between
year 2003–2016 we find that productivity measured by three TFP es-
timation methods and labour productivity is statistically and econom-
ically important and positive in determining firms' external finance, i.e.
total leverage, new issue of equity and long-term debt. We find strong
and robust results that productivity is helpful for firms to raise new
equity finance, but some weaker results for total leverage and long-term
debt. Such results hold for both the whole sample and private firms
separately. Our findings are sensible that external lenders would be
most interested in firms' ability in repaying debt, and less interested in
how efficient firms are. On the other hand, equity investors would be
most interested in firms' long-term operation as productive firms are
more likely to give them better return in the long run. Therefore, pro-
ductivity that indicates firms' overall quality would matter more for
equity investors and perhaps less for debt lenders as our results show.
We also find that large and/or old firms and exporting firms are able
to make better use of their productivity to gain external finance than
their respective counterparts, i.e. small young firms and non-exporting
firms. Again, the results are mainly valid for new equity finance, but not
quite for total leverage and long-term debt. Large and/or old firms are
less likely to suffer from information asymmetry problems, and are
often perceived to have better quality than small young firms by out-
siders. Exporters are also more likely to be the better firms than non-
exporters given the fact that they can afford the substantial sunk cost of
exporting. Thus, our results also suggest that better firms are able to
utilise productivity more to gain external finance.
We further confirm the causality of our results by using DID re-
gressions following an exogenous industrial policy shock during year
2010–2011. We find that this productivity-damaging policy indeed re-
duces external finance for firms in the affected industries.
Our research suggests a highly important relationship in the fi-
nancial market, i.e. despite the presence of information asymmetry,
productive good firms do get more external finance. This is an en-
couraging discovery of a possible virtuous circle between productivity
and finance. In addition our sample splitting test results give a further
important implication that productivity not only enables all firms to
raise external finance, the mechanism also forces financial resources to
Table 8
The effects of exogenous policy shock on external finance.
Dependent variable leverageit new equityit ltdit
(1) (2) (3)
Treati (β) 0.041⁎⁎⁎
(0.011)
−0.024⁎⁎
(0.011)
0.027⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
Postpolicyt (γ) −0.071⁎⁎⁎
(0.006)
−0.046⁎⁎⁎
(0.008)
−0.009⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
Treati × Postpolicyt (θ) 0.009
(0.015)
−0.019
(0.014)
−0.017⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
R2 0.050 0.036 0.062
Number of observations 14,949 14,944 14,739
Notes: The table reports the OLS results of the difference-in-difference estima-
tion in Eq. (3). The standard errors of estimated coefficients are reported in the
parentheses. Treatt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is in one of the
following manufacturing industries: cement and asbestine cement products;
coking; metal products; paper making and paper products; production of lea-
ther, fur, down and related products; smelting and pressing of ferrous metals;
smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals; and textile, and 0 otherwise.
Postpolicyt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in year 2012 to
2016, and 0 otherwise. Ownership dummies and province dummies are in-
cluded in all the regressions.
(footnote continued)
making and paper products; production of leather, fur down and related pro-
ducts; smelting and pressing of ferrous metals; smelting and pressing of non-
ferrous metal; and textile.
18 According to the Notice the only exception is the cement sector, which was
allowed to comply with the new regulation by the end of 2012. However, the
proportion of cement firms in our sample is small and it is more reasonable to
use 2010 and 2011 as the treatment period.
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shift towards the better quality firms and away from unproductive
firms.
Overall, our findings suggest that productivity is a good indicator of
firms' quality in the financial market, which could possibly reduce the
information asymmetry problem to some extent. If government policies
and regulations may target at channelling financial resources to pro-
ductive firms, it will contribute to improve aggregate productivity and
is certainly beneficial to an economy's sustainable growth in the long
term. Such mechanism would also contribute to a more sustainable fi-
nancial system itself, given that lenders and investors may find their
funds exposed to less risk in the hands of truly efficient firms. A well-
functioning financial market, even if it is frictional and costly for firms
to access, always generates a welfare gain. This is however beyond the
scope of this paper, and can be proved in a future study.
Appendix A. Appendix
A.1. Panel data structure
Table A1
Panel year structure.
Year Number of observations Percent Cumulative
2003 587 4.65 4.65
2004 659 5.22 9.87
2005 688 5.45 15.33
2006 749 5.94 21.26
2007 750 5.94 27.21
2008 802 6.36 33.56
2009 759 6.02 39.58
2010 782 6.20 45.78
2011 879 6.97 52.74
2012 1187 9.41 62.15
2013 1349 10.69 72.84
2014 1432 11.35 84.19
2015 1468 11.63 95.82
2016 527 4.18 100.00
Total 12,618 100.00
Table 9
The effects of exogenous policy shock on external finance.
Panel A
Dependent variable leverageit new equityit ltdit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small & young Others Small & young Others Small & young Others
Treati (β) 0.075⁎⁎⁎
(0.022)
0.020⁎
(0.012)
−0.059⁎
(0.030)
−0.002
(0.010)
0.013⁎⁎
(0.006)
0.029⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
Postpolicyt (γ) −0.149⁎⁎⁎
(0.011)
−0.087⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.197⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
0.001
(0.007)
−0.020⁎⁎⁎
(0.003)
−0.011⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
Treati × Postpolicyt (θ) −0.018
(0.033)
0.017
(0.016)
−0.039
(0.049)
−0.037⁎⁎⁎
(0.014)
−0.003
(0.008)
−0.021⁎⁎⁎
(0.005)
R2 0.127 0.047 0.085 0.022 0.121 0.063
number of observations 2918 12,031 2918 12,026 2897 11,842
Panel B
Dependent variable leverageit New equityit ltdit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exporter Non-exporter Exporter Non-exporter Exporter Non-exporter
Treati (β) 0.005
(0.013)
0.077⁎⁎⁎
(0.018)
−0.039⁎⁎
(0.016)
−0.017
(0.015)
0.017⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.035⁎⁎⁎
(0.005)
Postpolicyt (γ) −0.075⁎⁎⁎
(0.008)
−0.068⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
−0.077⁎⁎⁎
(0.011)
0.016
(0.011)
−0.014⁎⁎⁎
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.003)
Treati × Postpolicyt (θ) 0.017
(0.017)
0.034
(0.028)
−0.010
(0.099)
−0.014
(0.025)
−0.013⁎⁎⁎
(0.005)
−0.011
(0.008)
R2 0.072 0.044 0.040 0.039 0.078 0.064
number of observations 8714 6235 8710 6234 8568 6174
Notes: see notes to Table 8.
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Table A2
Panel years per firm structure.
Number of years per firm Number of observations Percent Cumulative
4 44 0.35 0.35
5 102 0.81 1.16
6 374 2.96 4.12
7 791 6.27 10.39
8 794 6.29 16.68
9 345 2.73 19.42
10 308 2.44 21.86
11 501 3.97 25.83
12 308 2.44 28.27
13 406 3.22 31.49
14 503 3.99 35.47
15 465 3.69 39.16
16 3398 26.93 66.09
17 4279 33.91 100.00
Total 12,618 100.00
Table A3
Panel ownership structure.
Ownership types Number of observations Percent Cumulative
Central state 3001 23.78 23.78
Lower level state 2903 23.01 46.79
Domestic private 5672 44.95 91.74
Foreign 536 4.25 95.99
Others 506 4.01 100.00
Total 12,618 100.00
A.2. Variable definitions
TFP_LP: estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method with the revenue function, applied separately to each 2-digit manufacturing
industrial group. The levpet Stata command was used in estimation. Also see Chen and Guariglia (2011) for more discussions. We use firms' real total
operating revenue as the proxy for revenue, real operating expense for intermediate input, real net fixed assets for capital and total number of
employees for labour.
TFP_Wooldridge: estimated using the Wooldridge (2009) GMM method applied separately for each 2-digit manufacturing industrial group. The
prodest Stata command was used in estimation. We use real total operating revenue for revenue, total number of employee for labour, real net fixed
assets for capital, and following Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2014) by using (operating cost – total wage) in real term for intermediate input and (total
operating revenue – intermediate input) in real term for output (added value).
TFP_acf: estimated using the Ackerberg et al. (2015) method applied separately for each 2-digit manufacturing industrial group. The prodest Stata
command was used in estimation. The definition of the variables is the same as the TFP_Wooldridge.
Labour productivity: real sales/number of employee.
Sales: operational revenue.
Leverage: total liabilities/total assets.
New equity: [(change of total shareholders' equity from year t-1 to t) – (change of retained earnings from t-1 to t)]/total assets at t-1. This
definition follows Baker et al. (2003).
Long-term debt: firms' outstanding long-term debt with maturity over 12months/total assets.
Asset growth: change of the logarithm of net fixed assets from t-1 to t.
Tangibility: total tangible assets/total assets.
Roa: net profit/total assets.
Depreciation: depreciation of fixed assets, oil and gas assets and bearer biological assets.
Labour intensity: cash paid to and on behalf of employees, including pay to retired staff/operational revenue.
Liquidity: (current assets – current liabilities)/total assets.
Coverage ratio: net profit/current liabilities.
Deflators: taken from the China Statistical Yearbook (various issues), which are published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The
provincial capital goods deflator was used to deflate the capital stock, and the provincial producer price indices (PPI) for manufactured goods to
deflate other variables, e.g. sales.
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A.3. More robustness check results
Table A4
The effect of productivity on the changes of total leverage.
Dependent variable: Δleverageit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δleveragei,t-1 0.035
(0.062)
0.025
(0.054)
0.014
(0.060)
0.015
(0.059)
0.133
(0.096)
0.157
(0.100)
0.026
(0.067)
0.117
(0.077)
logSit-1 −0.000
(0.007)
−0.053⁎⁎
(0.022)
−0.017⁎
(0.009)
−0.005
(0.008)
0.005
(0.011)
−0.065⁎⁎
(0.029)
−0.017
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.012)
asset growthit-1 −0.005
(0.030)
−0.007
(0.025)
−0.010
(0.030)
−0.005
(0.029)
−0.063
(0.042)
−0.076⁎
(0.041)
−0.027
(0.032)
−0.061⁎
(0.033)
tangibilityit-1 0.063
(0.105)
0.098
(0.101)
0.130
(0.119)
−0.058
(0.097)
0.208
(0.176)
0.324⁎
(0.201)
0.140
(0.148)
0.082
(0.152)
roait-1 0.613⁎⁎⁎
(0.173)
0.802⁎⁎⁎
(0.143)
0.708⁎⁎⁎
(0.145)
0.804⁎⁎⁎
(0.166)
0.840⁎⁎⁎
(0.282)
0.770⁎⁎⁎
(0.283)
0.705⁎⁎⁎
(0.179)
0.663⁎⁎⁎
(0.201)
depit-1 −0.394
(0.899)
−0.144
(0.817)
−0.109
(0.890)
0.433
(0.849)
−3.080⁎
(1.747)
−2.719
(1.692)
−0.560
(1.187)
−1.949
(1.573)
logtfpit-1 0.100
(0.061)
1.359⁎⁎
(0.644)
0.471⁎⁎
(0.195)
0.001
(0.075)
1.688⁎⁎
(0.816)
0.457⁎
(0.255)
labour intensityit-1 0.108
(0.194)
0.341
(0.308)
loglpit-1 0.011
(0.013)
0.034⁎
(0.019)
m2 (p-value) 0.764
m3 (p-value) 0.816 0.742 0.788 0.632 0.917 0.867 0.970
J (Hansen) 0.123 0.408 0.104 0.193 0.633 0.528 0.578 0.299
IVs (lags) t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
number of observations 12,618 12,623 12,623 12,624 5672 5674 5674 5676
Notes: All specifications were estimated using system GMM estimators. i indexes firms; and t, time. All the regressions include year dummies, industry dummies which
are at 2 digit level, and province dummies which indicate the location of firms' headquarter. The whole sample regressions also include ownership dummies. The
figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. m2 and m3 are tests for second- and third-order serial correlations in the first-differenced residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. J tests show the validity of the instrument sets. ⁎ indicates significance at the 10% level. ⁎⁎
indicates significance at the 5% level. ⁎⁎⁎ indicates significance at the 1% level. Also see Notes to Table 1.
Table A5
The effect of productivity on current leverage.
Dependent variable: current leverageit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
current leveragei,t-1 0.661⁎⁎⁎
(0.037)
0.621⁎⁎⁎
(0.039)
0.610⁎⁎⁎
(0.040)
0.631⁎⁎⁎
(0.038)
0.730⁎⁎⁎
(0.062)
0.737⁎⁎⁎
(0.061)
0.720⁎⁎⁎
(0.061)
0.711⁎⁎⁎
(0.053)
logSit-1 0.012⁎
(0.006)
−0.036
(0.025)
−0.008
(0.010)
0.020⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
0.005
(0.009)
0.026
(0.058)
−0.002
(0.016)
0.004
(0.012)
asset growthit-1 −0.154⁎⁎⁎
(0.023)
−0.183⁎⁎⁎
(0.024)
−0.180⁎⁎⁎
(0.026)
−0.157⁎⁎⁎
(0.022)
−0.174⁎⁎⁎
(0.039)
−0.202⁎⁎⁎
(0.039)
−0.202⁎⁎⁎
(0.042)
−0.157⁎⁎⁎
(0.037)
tangibilityit-1 0.320⁎⁎⁎
(0.099)
0.422⁎⁎⁎
(0.117)
0.424⁎⁎⁎
(0.124)
0.374⁎⁎⁎
(0.094)
0.406⁎⁎
(0.183)
0.475⁎⁎
(0.196)
0.482⁎⁎
(0.191)
0.504⁎⁎⁎
(0.170)
roait-1 −0.132
(0.172)
−0.580⁎⁎⁎
(0.161)
−0.504⁎⁎⁎
(0.161)
−0.128
(0.137)
−0.324
(0.242)
−0.351
(0.229)
−0.362
(0.226)
−0.142
(0.212)
depit-1 −3.912⁎⁎⁎
(0.811)
−3.112⁎⁎⁎
(0.864)
−3.285⁎⁎⁎
(0.835)
−4.059⁎⁎⁎
(0.785)
−4.233⁎⁎
(1.808)
−5.455⁎⁎⁎
(1.718)
−4.948⁎⁎⁎
(1.670)
−4.754⁎⁎⁎
(1.643)
logtfpit-1 −0.070
(0.063)
1.367⁎
(0.701)
0.384⁎
(0.231)
−0.003
(0.078)
−0.667
(1.545)
0.131
(0.326)
labour intensityit-1 0.245
(0.182)
0.110
(0.329)
loglpit-1 −0.015
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.024)
m3 (p-value) 0.933 0.936 0.668 0.699 0.716 0.577
m4 (p-value) 0.957 0.955
J (Hansen) 0.146 0.260 0.117 0.209 0.544 0.392 0.352 0.149
IVs (lags) t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-4,7…
Δt-3…
t-4,…
Δt-3…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
number of observations 12,616 12,621 12,623 12,622 5671 5673 5673 5675
Notes: see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
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Table A6
The effect of productivity on short-term debt.
Dependent variable: stdit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
stdi,t-1 0.643⁎⁎⁎
(0.055)
0.676⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
0.704⁎⁎⁎
(0.044)
0.615⁎⁎⁎
(0.055)
0.579⁎⁎⁎
(0.049)
0.635⁎⁎⁎
(0.062)
0.504⁎⁎⁎
(0.049)
0.642⁎⁎⁎
(0.059)
logSit-1 0.009⁎⁎
(0.005)
0.007
(0.008)
0.003
(0.005)
0.007⁎⁎⁎
(0.004)
0.009⁎⁎
(0.004)
−0.003
(0.011)
0.009⁎
(0.005)
0.011⁎
(0.006)
asset growthit-1 −0.035⁎
(0.019)
−0.029⁎⁎⁎
(0.010)
−0.045⁎⁎
(0.018)
−0.042⁎⁎
(0.019)
−0.046⁎⁎⁎
(0.015)
−0.048⁎⁎⁎
(0.017)
−0.043⁎⁎⁎
(0.013)
−0.039⁎⁎
(0.019)
tangibilityit-1 0.228⁎⁎⁎
(0.075)
0.191⁎⁎⁎
(0.050)
0.238⁎⁎⁎
(0.086)
0.262⁎⁎⁎
(0.061)
0.343⁎⁎⁎
(0.082)
0.459⁎⁎⁎
(0.111)
0.269⁎⁎⁎
(0.103)
0.387⁎⁎⁎
(0.101)
roait-1 −0.248⁎⁎
(0.108)
−0.016
(0.074)
0.187⁎
(0.109)
-0.234⁎⁎
(0.102)
0.008
(0.096)
0.049
(0.131)
−0.024
(0.074)
0.081
(0.135)
depit-1 −2.097⁎⁎⁎
(0.609)
−1.304⁎⁎⁎
(0.389)
−1.664⁎⁎
(0.658)
−2.148⁎⁎⁎
(0.563)
−2.685⁎⁎⁎
(0.770)
−3.346⁎⁎⁎
(0.939)
−1.761⁎⁎
(0.803)
−3.168⁎⁎⁎
(0.964)
logtfpit-1 −0.049
(0.040)
−0.066
(0.239)
−0.005
(0.106)
−0.016
(0.027)
0.269
(0.344)
−0.044
(0.121)
labour intensityit-1 −0.103
(0.139)
−0.011
(0.172)
loglpit-1 −0.012
(0.009)
−0.013
(0.012)
m3 (p-value) 0.781 0.615 0.638 0.61 0.768 0.606
m4 (p-value) 0.796 0.846
J (Hansen) 0. 412 0.118 0.125 0.145 0.292 0.776 0.977 0.648
IVs (lags) t-4,…
Δt-3…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-4,…
Δt-3…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
number of observations 12,614 12,619 12,619 12,620 5672 5674 5674 5676
Notes: see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
Table A7
The effect of productivity (moving average) on total leverage.
Dependent variable: total leverageit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
total leveragei,t-1 0.663⁎⁎⁎
(0.037)
0.676⁎⁎⁎
(0.034)
0.646⁎⁎⁎
(0.034)
0.639⁎⁎⁎
(0.037)
0.695⁎⁎⁎
(0.043)
0.671⁎⁎⁎
(0.041)
0.664⁎⁎⁎
(0.045)
0.632⁎⁎⁎
(0.047)
logSit-1 0.003
(0.009)
−0.137⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.021⁎
(0.012)
0.014
(0.009)
−0.009
(0.010)
−0.127⁎⁎⁎
(0.031)
−0.037⁎⁎⁎
(0.013)
0.002
(0.010)
asset growthit-1 −0.231⁎⁎⁎
(0.031)
−0.226⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.231⁎⁎⁎
(0.032)
−0.249⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
−0.197⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
−0.168⁎⁎⁎
(0.026)
−0.186⁎⁎⁎
(0.027)
−0.159⁎⁎⁎
(0.025)
tangibilityit-1 0.666⁎⁎⁎
(0.113)
0.935⁎⁎⁎
(0.130)
0.803⁎⁎⁎
(0.133)
0.693⁎⁎⁎
(0.115)
0.949⁎⁎⁎
(0.139)
1.049⁎⁎⁎
(0.150)
1.016⁎⁎⁎
(0.159)
0.869⁎⁎⁎
(0.139)
roait-1 −0.517⁎⁎
(0.200)
−0.338⁎
(0.192)
−0.451⁎⁎
(0.196)
−0.314⁎
(0.170)
−0.321
(0.195)
−0.225
(0.175)
−0.241
(0.176)
−0.223
(0.168)
depit-1 −5.968⁎⁎⁎
(0.952)
−6.077⁎⁎⁎
(0.925)
−5.380⁎⁎⁎
(0.942)
−6.147⁎⁎⁎
(1.003)
−7.885⁎⁎⁎
(1.279)
−6.909⁎⁎⁎
(1.238)
−7.267⁎⁎⁎
(1.331)
−6.737⁎⁎⁎
(1.196)
logtfpit-1 0.226⁎⁎⁎
(0.068)
4.226⁎⁎⁎
(0.796)
0.914⁎⁎⁎
(0.231)
0.204⁎⁎
(0.084)
3.568⁎⁎⁎
(0.866)
0.848⁎⁎⁎
(0.278)
labour intensityit-1 0.595⁎⁎
(0.261)
0.594⁎⁎⁎
(0.195)
loglpit-1 0.048⁎⁎⁎
(0.017)
0.042⁎⁎
(0.020)
m3 (p-value) 0.692 0.872 0.764 0.729
m4 (p-value) 0.228 0.153 0.201 0.187
J (Hansen) 0.092 0.099 0.050 0.163 0.686 0.343 0.526 0.997
IVs (lags) t-4,…
Δt-3…
t-4,…
Δt-3…
t-4,…
Δt-3…
t-4,…
Δt-3…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
number of observations 13,652 13,656 13,656 13,653 6468 6471 6471 6470
Notes: see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
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Table A8
The effect of productivity (moving average) on new equity.
Dependent variable: new equityit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
new equityi,t-1 0.026
(0.023)
0.006⁎⁎⁎
(0.022)
0.011⁎⁎⁎
(0.022)
0.010
(0.023)
0.029
(0.032)
0.041
(0.034)
0.066⁎
(0.035)
0.085⁎⁎
(0.037)
logSit-1 −0.031
(0.007)
−0.174⁎⁎⁎
(0.024)
−0.073⁎⁎⁎
(0.011)
−0.048⁎⁎⁎
(0.009)
−0.049⁎⁎⁎
(0.012)
−0.255⁎⁎⁎
(0.050)
−0.110⁎⁎⁎
(0.021)
−0.062⁎⁎⁎
(0.016)
asset growthit-1 −0.046⁎
(0.031)
−0.054⁎⁎
(0.022)
−0.067⁎⁎⁎
(0.023)
−0.050⁎⁎
(0.020)
−0.104⁎⁎⁎
(0.028)
−0.126⁎⁎⁎
(0.037)
−0.149⁎⁎⁎
(0.038)
−0.104⁎⁎⁎
(0.037)
tangibilityit-1 0.165
(0.127)
0.397⁎⁎⁎
(0.109)
0.462⁎⁎⁎
(0.120)
0.011
(0.118)
0.265
(0.202)
0.774⁎⁎⁎
(0.252)
0.870⁎⁎⁎
(0.271)
0.463⁎
(0.242)
roait-1 0.405⁎⁎
(0.199)
0.399⁎⁎
(0.161)
0.416⁎⁎
(0.162)
0.333⁎
(0.174)
0.473⁎⁎
(0.233)
−0.351
(0.229)
1.054⁎⁎⁎
(0.284)
0.703⁎⁎
(0.293)
depit-1 1.036
(1.030)
1.160
(0.864)
0.818
(0.824)
2.492⁎⁎⁎
(0.956)
0.641
(1.562)
−5.455⁎⁎⁎
(1.718)
−1.508
(2.217)
0.626
(2.127)
logtfpit-1 0.123⁎⁎
(0.061)
3.959⁎⁎⁎
(0.608)
1.149⁎⁎⁎
(0.179)
0.225⁎⁎
(0.088)
−0.667
(1.545)
1.400⁎⁎⁎
(0.303)
labour intensityit-1 −0.044
(0.255)
0.668⁎⁎
(0.317)
loglpit-1 0.068⁎⁎⁎
(0.016)
0.108⁎⁎⁎
(0.020)
m3 (p-value) 0.672 0.745 0.569 0.260 0.206 0.699 0.388 0.199
J (Hansen) 0.039 0.169 0.114 0.118 0.607 0.392 0.328 0.555
IVs (lags) t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
number of observations 13,644 13,648 13,648 13,645 6468 6471 6471 6470
Notes: see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
Table A9
The effect of productivity (moving average) on long-term debt.
Dependent variable: ltdit All Private
LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity LP Wooldridge ACF Labour productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ltdi,t-1 0.689⁎⁎⁎
(0.029)
0.676⁎⁎⁎
(0.029)
0.675⁎⁎⁎
(0.030)
0.010
(0.023)
0.616⁎⁎⁎
(0.050)
0.535⁎⁎⁎
(0.047)
0.537⁎⁎⁎
(0.049)
0.085⁎⁎
(0.037)
logSit-1 −0.001
(0.002)
−0.012⁎
(0.007)
−0.004
(0.003)
−0.048⁎⁎⁎
(0.009)
0.007⁎⁎
(0.003)
−0.017⁎
(0.009)
−0.003
(0.004)
−0.062⁎⁎⁎
(0.016)
asset growthit-1 −0.013
(0.008)
−0.020⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.021⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.050⁎⁎
(0.020)
−0.019⁎
(0.011)
−0.021⁎⁎
(0.008)
−0.024⁎⁎⁎
(0.007)
−0.104⁎⁎⁎
(0.037)
tangibilityit-1 0.076⁎⁎
(0.030)
0.092⁎⁎⁎
(0.028)
0.104⁎⁎⁎
(0.028)
0.011
(0.118)
0.033
(0.041)
0.083⁎
(0.043)
0.085⁎
(0.047)
0.463⁎
(0.242)
roait-1 0.129⁎⁎
(0.056)
0.130⁎⁎⁎
(0.043)
0.137⁎⁎⁎
(0.044)
0.333⁎
(0.174)
0.034
(0.070)
0.088
(0.054)
0.073
(0.052)
0.703⁎⁎
(0.293)
depit-1 −0.511⁎⁎
(0.215)
−0.557⁎⁎⁎
(0.197)
−0.628⁎⁎⁎
(0.196)
2.492⁎⁎⁎
(0.956)
−0.815⁎
(0.420)
−0.919⁎⁎⁎
(0.282)
−0.971⁎⁎⁎
(0.286)
0.626
(2.127)
logtfpit-1 0.032⁎
(0.018)
0.348⁎
(0.185)
0.102⁎⁎
(0.050)
0.008
(0.023)
0.644⁎⁎⁎
(0.242)
0.172⁎⁎
(0.072)
labour intensityit-1 −0.044
(0.255)
0.668⁎⁎
(0.317)
loglpit-1 0.068⁎⁎⁎
(0.016)
0.108⁎⁎⁎
(0.020)
m2 (p-value) 0.445
m3 (p-value) 0.257 0.346 0.346 0.260 0.097 0.101 0.199
J (Hansen) 0.391 0.210 0.177 0.118 0.529 0.118 0.191 0.555
IVs (lags) t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-2,…
Δt-1…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
t-3,…
Δt-2…
number of observations 12,402 13,425 13,425 13,645 5564 6349 6349 6470
Notes: see notes to Tables 1 and 2.
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